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The relevance of Husserl’s phenomenological
exploration of interiority to contemporary
epistemology
Biagio G. Tassone1

ABSTRACT Phenomenology represents a detailed and systematic attempt to understand the
structures of ﬁrst person lived experience. This article examines the relevance of Husserl’s
writings and their introduction of the “phenomenological reduction” as the distinguishing
characteristic of his transcendental form of phenomenology. A close examination of Husserl’s
writings is given to highlight the centrality of the reduction for the justiﬁcation of basic beliefs. It
is subsequently shown how Husserl’s analyses of intentional acts have ongoing implications for
the knowledge internalism versus knowledge externalism debate. This debate revolves around
how knowledge is justiﬁed and how belief claims are warranted. Although the debate, in its
modern form, can be traced back to the mid-twentieth century, Husserl’s methods were not
introduced in dealing with internalist and externalist accounts of knowledge attainment until
recently. Modern externalists, who for the most part are not phenomenologists, have subsequently largely condemned Husserl’s methods as promoting a strict Cartesian internalist justiﬁcation of belief claims. These criticisms were met by attempts to characterize transcendental
phenomenology as actually promoting something closer to externalism in epistemology. The
following article attempts to show how Husserl’s phenomenology actively engages with problems related to the interiority of knowledge claims but in a radically different way from nonphenomenological approaches promoting internalism. Nonetheless, it is argued that transcendental phenomenology cannot be regarded as anything approaching a mainstream or even
reworked “externalist” account of securing knowledge. Highlighting what Husserl calls “the
paradox of subjectivity,” it is shown how his transcendental phenomenology develops a sui
generis form of internalism. Since few modern internalists make use of Husserl’s texts, and postHusserlian phenomenology has taken something like an externalist turn (as witnessed, for
example, in recent interpretations of the writings of Heidegger and Sartre), it is argued that
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology should be taken more seriously by contemporary
philosophers interested in knowledge internalism. These conclusions, subsequently, are relevant to promoting a better understanding of the justiﬁcation of knowledge claims, both within
and outside of the phenomenological program. Husserl’s writings are important to contemporary issues such as the theoretical understanding of the relationship between epistemology and philosophy of science (broadly conceived), as well as the relation of
phenomenology to contemporary philosophy of mind.
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Introduction
Noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas.
St. Augustine De Vera Religione, XXXIX. 72

S

ince the time of Descartes philosophers have sought to
establish what justiﬁes true beliefs by examining the
epistemic conditions immediately underlying knowledge
claims. As critics of this “foundationalist” model for the
justiﬁcation of knowledge have pointed out, there is a strong
element of subjectivism evident in making the warrant for truth
hinge on a connection to so-called mental acts. In this way, so the
critics of the modern epistemological tradition assert, the
evidence required for declaring the truth or falsity of beliefs is
gained only at the expense of inextricably connecting an internal
private element to the locus of truth. Today, thinkers who still
accept an essential role for mental factors in securing warrant
for our true beliefs are called “internalists”. Those philosophers
who believe that factors lying outside an individual’s mental
activity ultimately justify knowledge, by contrast, are called
“externalists”.1 In this article, Edmund Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology is examined as a philosophical, rather than
exclusively methodological, approach for justifying truth-making
conditions. Husserlian phenomenology is then interpreted as a
defense of foundationalism and the internalist approach in
epistemology, that is, a philosophy of the subject. It will be shown
how an important contribution of Husserl’s to these matters has
been largely overlooked; namely, his phenomenological
conception of immediate experience as self-transcending
ground for justifying true beliefs. Husserl’s analysis of the
justiﬁcation of knowledge claims, it is argued, can be shown to
stand as a challenge to anti-foundationalist assumptions and
externalist theories of knowledge attainment alike. As will be
demonstrated, the task of exploring experience and internal
relations is especially well-suited for treatment by Husserlian
phenomenology since it developed a dynamic analysis of the
importance of consciousness as allowing epistemic access to
evidence. It is the detailed analysis of perception and thought
undertaken by Husserl that allowed him to develop an account of
how “objective” and structural features of the world are given
directly to experiencing subjects.
As a consequence, and as has already been noted by various
thinkers, Husserl’s writings are relevant to the ongoing
externalism versus internalism debate in contemporary epistemology. Unfortunately there is, to date, no consensus on precisely
how Husserl’s writings should be understood in the context of
this debate and arguments both for and against internalism
and externalism as best characterizing Husserlian phenomenology can be found. After outlining the central aspects of
Husserl’s general strategy for analysing the structure of belief
claims, it is argued that his phenomenology supports a necessary
emphasis on epistemological internalism. This claim merits
stressing since it has recently been challenged by some
Husserlians. In support of this claim, it will be stressed how
Husserl’s thought is an expansion of the Socratic/Cartesian
project regarding the justiﬁcation of truth as requiring an account
of how rational belief is possible. Since Husserl sought to explain
the justiﬁcation of basic beliefs by reliance on the phenomenological reduction, it is shown that externalist factors, although
important to Husserl, cannot ultimately warrant the justiﬁcation
of genuine knowledge claims. For this reason alone, rejecting the
internalist aspects of his project does Husserl no favours and,
worse, it robs us of some of some very strong arguments
challenging the coherence of externalism as a viable basis for
grounding epistemology.
2

Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, therefore, can
demonstrate how, in maintaining an indispensable role for
mental states as permitting access to evidence, internal states are a
necessary condition for helping determine not only how valid
beliefs are formed but also how knowledge about the world is
established. In this sense, mainly due to his radical understanding
of transcendence in immanence and the role played by the
transcendental phenomenological reduction in resolving the
“paradox of subjectivity”, Husserl’s thought can be shown to
manifest a sui generis form of internalism.
The implications of my study will highlight how Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology should be taken more seriously
by contemporary philosophers interested in knowledge internalism. These conclusions can also be viewed as relevant in helping
contemporary philosophers to promote a better understanding of
the justiﬁcation structure of knowledge both within and outside
of the phenomenological program. Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology is frequently cited by thinkers working in the
humanities and social sciences, but if the assessment of his
achievements offered here are correct, Husserl’s mature thought
also has important insights to contribute to contemporary
epistemological studies in analytic philosophy, including the
understanding of the relationship between epistemology and
philosophy of science. After providing a critical assessment of
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological reduction in securing
essential structures, the article concludes by highlighting the
challenges posed by Husserl's thought to naturalistic versions of
externalism and causal accounts of belief formation.
Husserl’s early phenomenology as a science of subjectivity
From the very beginning of his career Edmund Husserl (1859–
1938) was interested in the epistemological problem of how we
obtain objective knowledge.2 What distinguished Husserl’s
writings from those of other logicians or philosophers of the
early twentieth century were his detailed explorations of how the
attainment of objective knowledge was connected to essentially
subjective sources. Husserl’s initial, epistemologically oriented,
studies focused on assessing the intentional character of mental
states in the attainment of knowledge.3 This focus on
intentionality and the concomitant role of mental acts for
presenting intentional objects was soon found to contain
theoretical limitations and Husserl eventually came to radicalize
his approach and expand his analyses to embrace ﬁelds such as
temporality, inter-subjectivity and culture from within a
“transcendental” phenomenological perspective. Through his
later phenomenological studies, moreover, Husserl sought to
provide a more systematic treatment of the role of subjectivity in
constituting both theoretical claims (such as the origin of the laws
of formal logic in pre-predicative experience), as well as the
essential role played by perception in establishing how objects
and meanings are given in “intuitive” acts of fulﬁllment.
From early on, in other words, Husserl maintained that a
descriptive account of internal factors was important for understanding the structure of our knowledge claims. It can be shown
that Husserl’s concern with belief as a species of internal states
plays an essential role in the formation and the later expansion of
his phenomenological method, beginning with his exploration of
psychologism in the connection of mental acts to logical truth. As
is well known, Husserl published the ﬁrst part of his Logical
Investigations (the Prolegomena to Pure Logic) in 1900 and
therein catalogued and criticized various forms of psychologism.4
In the Prolegomena, the psychologistic positions explored
included: anthropological and psychological interpretations of
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the validity of logical laws (cf. Husserl, 2001, vol. 1, §§ 39–40), the
theory of thought-economy: a sort of evolutionary or biological
reductionism regarding knowledge claims (ibid., §§ 52–6), as well
as radical empirical accounts of how we gain knowledge, as found
in, for example, the empiricism of John Stuart Mill (ibid., § 26).
While Husserl shared a strong interest in exploring thought and
consciousness with earlier psychologists and psychologistic
philosophers, he remained a vociferous critic of psychologism
throughout his life. This led him to take up some interesting
positions regarding subjectivity, objectivity and the connection
between the two. To thematize the difference between subjectivity
and objectivity in a more adequate manner, Husserl originally
understood interior experience in a narrow manner, a result of his
focus on descriptive psychological studies of the relation of
mental acts to mathematical objects and the objective status of
logical laws. In other words, early on, the mental is viewed by
Husserl as a medium for revealing the stable elements of
adequately given contents manifested in cognitive judgments.
With his “breakthrough to phenomenology”, however, Husserl
came to expand the implications of his theory of the
intentionality of consciousness. Beginning in the second part of
the Logical Investigations, Husserl views phenomenology as
resulting from determined efforts “to lay bare the subjective
sources (from which) objective scientiﬁc judgments originate”.5
To reveal these sources various descriptive studies of meaningtaking signitive and intuitive meaning-fulﬁlling intentional acts
were utilized.6 Whenever we think about something, Husserl
maintains, the correlate of our thought is an intentional object
(Husserl, 1979: 303–348). Depending what I am thinking about,
moreover, my thought content (along with the meaning I intend)
need not even exist in the natural world. For this reason, from
early on, Husserl came to believe that the structure of mental
reference is not essentially related to transcendent entities.
Nonetheless, Husserl also quickly began to view his original
foray into descriptive accounts of experience as unsatisfactory.
Descriptive psychology failed to capture the full import and the
dynamic-open structure of intentional experiences. As a
corrective Husserl developed his mature “transcendental”
approach to phenomenology but only after various attempts at
revising and expanding the earlier analytic “descriptive”
phenomenology proved unsuccessful.7
Subjective experience and objective categories: Husserl’s
movement to the transcendental
Originally, interior access to evidence was relied on by Husserl to
clarify the epistemic relationship of intuitions (immediate direct
awareness) to objects and contents given through experience. In
his earliest writings, the role of intentional objects or contents
(along with their modes of givenness) were deemed important for
understanding how subjective factors work in helping secure
knowledge and meaning. Although inﬂuenced in this regard by
the earlier philosophical work of the British empiricists, from
early on Husserl rejected the empiricist assumption that
consciousness is either reducible to physiological/natural categories or analogous to some kind of “container” for holding
ideas.8 Critical of the theory that “internal ideas”, as a medium for
representing the world, can produce knowledge (through mental
mechanisms of “association”) the entire “way of ideas” is
effectively diagnosed by Husserl as the result of an empiricist
distortion of the true nature of perceptual experience.9 At this
stage, Husserl insists, beliefs require reasons, but if doxastic
justiﬁcation relates solely to immanent ideas then it will be
rendered problematic. Even if, as Husserl came to realize, internal
properties of mental states are immediately accessible, the “nonmental” world that the beliefs are purportedly about (that is,

physical or transcendent objects and events) are rendered only
indirectly accessible on a representationalist model of reference
and meaning. Thus, from early on Husserl’s writings directly
address what later philosophers call the “access problem” in
epistemology. According to Husserl, skepticism (which ultimately
is also what a strong psychologism amounts to) easily arises
regarding the reliability of even the most basic belief claims if
radical empiricist assumptions about the mind are uncritically
accepted.
Upon concluding that pure empiricism manifests fatal
theoretical weaknesses, therefore, Husserl began to broaden his
framework to include a critical assessment of how we attain
knowledge.10 To say Husserl was critical of empiricism, therefore,
is not to say that representations and mental factors for accessing
the world (such as intentionality, feelings, judgments and even
the “association of ideas”), do not have an important role in his
account of mental life. According to Husserl, however, these
processes are misunderstood when reduced to objectivist
categories dependent upon external causal factors. As regards
perception, for example, Husserlian phenomenology criticizes all
earlier forms of representational realism. From the Logical
Investigations onwards, perception is described as directly
giving objects and phenomenal data that provides evidence
about how the world is. Through perception, which is frequently
correlated to public objects given directly “in the ﬂesh”
(“leibhaft”), we achieve immediate access to both objects in the
world and the structure of perceptual experience.
Nonetheless, Husserl early on accepted that physical objects
are, by their nature, given in a necessarily incomplete way. For
example, my computer is presented to me from a particular
perspective. Many of the details about its appearance are, of
necessity, permanently hidden from me (I cannot currently see its
micro-processors or internal wiring, but I assume they exist and
can anticipate seeing them if I, for example, take the required
steps of opening up the computer’s outer casing). Matters are
different in the case of concepts and ideas. What is mental,
according to the early Husserl, can be given with adequacy and
even apodictically, that is, with maximum evidence, through
higher order “categorial” experiences. Therefore, that I am
thinking about the computer as existing is impossible to doubt.
That its colored surface is presented to me simultaneously with
the perception of its presence in a spatial-temporal ﬁeld is
another a priori feature of perception. In this way, apart from
perceiving the property of existence as adhering to any actual
object or quality, the factors necessary for determining the
justiﬁcation for my saying “there is a computer in front of me” are
largely internal to the structure of the perceptive acts that present
the computer.
Given the above, Husserl’s early phenomenology deemed
descriptive psychology of mental acts as necessary for understanding both intuitive and symbolic presentations of objects.
However, even at this early stage Husserl’s thought eschews a
simplistic classiﬁcation of mental acts as fully justifying knowledge. Under the inﬂuence of the neo-Kantian thinker Hermann
Lotze and his one-time teacher the psychologist Carl Stumpf,
Husserl had developed a doctrine of “states of affairs”
(Sachverhalt) as ideal and transcendent (non-physical and nonmental) references of expressions or propositions. The reference
base, by contrast, accessible privately, was early on called the
“situation of affairs” (Sachlage) by Husserl. The same represented
situation (the Sachlage that “a computer is present on the
desk”), can be apprehended in different ways by different people
leading to a different situation constituting and justifying
the same state of affairs as true or false (cf. Husserl, 2001, vol.
1., Prol. Chp. 11, pp. 144–161 and Inv. 1, §§ 11–13, pp. 194–199).
As will be seen, these distinctions will prove essential to making
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sense of the difference between truth-stating (propositional) contents
versus truth-making (world-dependent) factors and, from early on
will inform the Husserlian account for establishing the basis of truth.
The different levels of reﬂection that distinguish, for example, the
apprehension of something in a judgment, along with the required
representational content as the possibility condition for making a
judgment in the ﬁrst place, is an important distinction introduced in
the Logical Investigations and developed more fully by Husserl in
later writings.11
Refusing to give either internal or external factors a privileged
epistemological role, therefore, the early Husserl implies that
neither the extra-mental existence of a transcendent object nor
the subjectively experienced sensuous contents of a concrete
intuitive presentation are the most relevant factors for afﬁrming
the correlates of meaningful expressions. In the Investigations,
Husserl instead offers a theory of “ideal” objects (there called
“species”) grasped through judgments involving categorial
intuitions, as constituting the ultimate objective reference for
meaning and truth claims. Although, as we will see, this platonic
understanding of semantics introduces an ambiguity on Husserl’s
part regarding the ontological status of purely transcendent
objects, in making the objective correlates of acts the primary
focus of his research Husserl was spurred to develop a more
detailed delimitation of what is “interior”. To further expand his
phenomenological project, however, Husserl deemed it necessary
to seek nothing less than the radical reform of modern
philosophy since the time of Descartes. He proceeded to
undertake this goal by theoretically conjoining the innate
teleological sense of rational life to nature in a new way.
Subjectivity and Interiority as Natural versus
phenomenologically apprehended contents
In a programmatic essay from 1911, outlining his idea of
philosophy, Husserl asks:
How can experience as consciousness give or make contact
with an object? How can experiences be mutually
legitimated or corrected by means of each other, and not
merely replace each other or conﬁrm each other subjectively? How can the play of a consciousness whose logic is
empirical make objectively valid statements, valid for
things that are in and for themselves? Why are the playing
rules, so to speak, of consciousness not irrelevant for
things? How is natural science to be comprehensible in
absolutely every case, to the extent that it pretends at every
step to posit and to know a nature that is in itself- in itself
in opposition to the subjective ﬂow of consciousness?
(Husserl, 1965: 87–88).12
Husserl’s earlier “analytic” phenomenology (in the Investigations) also tried to answer the above questions but was unable to
adequately clarify the ambivalence of the subjective activity
making objective knowledge possible. Using descriptive and
psychological categories in the Investigations, Husserl effectively
bypassed any account of non-empirical factors, for example, the
“ego-pole” as center of all experience, and ignored the more basic
constitutive sources of meaning and knowledge. In other words,
Husserl’s original studies of consciousness took cognitive acts to
be intentionally directed but also viewed them as methodologically divorced from any deeper analysis of the internally
apprehended noetic sources of those same acts. Later, after the
Ideas I, Husserl comes to publically maintain that the “ego cogito”,
now understood as an “ego-pole” of pure experiences, indicates
an “openly inﬁnite” multiplicity of particular concrete subjective
processes centered within a “transcendental ego”.
4

Embracing a transcendental approach leads Husserl to transform phenomenology into a much more ambitious undertaking,
one seeking a broader account of experience than was found in
his initial descriptive studies. The turn to the subject in the later
Husserl is also accompanied by a subsequent method for
obtaining adequate knowledge of the proper foundations for a
transcendental project, that is, the transcendental phenomenological reduction. The term reduction (from the Latin re-ducere: to
lead back) suggests the radical movement towards interiority that
characterizes this direct and immediate contact with the world of
experience. Pure phenomenology, according to Husserl, will
explore experience before we apply our conceptual categories and
scientiﬁc theories to its lived meanings.13 Since Husserl’s later
approach is “transcendental” we might here question the validity
of calling the insights he is seeking “internal”. This assumption,
however, fails to take into account the epistemological aims
involved in the use of the method of reduction, as well as
Husserl’s simultaneous commitment to a non-deﬂationary
yet also anti-representationalist view of consciousness. Brieﬂy, if
the reduction is a way of relating to the already existing world,
and if the world reveals itself to us directly in what Husserl calls
“positing acts”, then the immanently present psychological
mental acts in their intentional world-directed nature must be
the access point to initiating the reduction. In fact they form the
only possible access point. To think otherwise is to fall prey to the
objectivist bias of the natural attitude. In this respect, the factors
that led Husserl to radicalize his earlier phenomenological
approach can here be noted. Where the earlier descriptive
studies posited a separation between internal and psychological,
that is, concrete but subjective, acts of consciousness as distinct
from the ideal species and adequately grasped meanings, a
signiﬁcant change about the sense of the terms “factual” and
“essential” takes place in his thinking between 1900 and 1912
(culminating in the publication of Ideas I in 1913).
In the Logical Investigations Husserl opposes the “real” to both
the “ideal” and the “universal” (cf. Husserl, 2001, vol. 1, Inv. I, §3;
8/Husserl, 1984, vol. 2, p. 101; 123). By the time of the Ideas I,
however, (and continuing into later writings) what is “real” comes
to signify what Husserl calls the “transcendent” (of the ego-pole)
content with “irreal being” now equated to the immanent being of
pure consciousness. What this amounts to, beyond the introduction of a “transcendental ego” delimiting a new conception of the
unity of subjective life, is a reinterpretation of the fact/essence
distinction. Husserl reinterprets the categories of “fact” and
“essence” against a new distinction between what he calls
“immanence” and “transcendence” now explored in light of
sustained attempts to highlight the most basic foundations of
knowledge as constituted by conscious acts.
Around 1907, Husserl clariﬁes that the distinction between fact
and essence can actually be found within the realm of “pure
consciousness” conceived as an interior sphere of egoic-life.14
Factual and “absolute phenomena” (now called, in allusion to
Descartes, cogitationes) are held to be immanent in the sense
relevant to the phenomenologist. Yet, what Husserl calls “logical
modiﬁcations” of cogitationes, including their singular, speciﬁc
and generic essences, are now described as immanent in a new
sense. Since an essence does not possess its being as a “reell” part
of the stream of consciousness, what is essential cannot be
immanent in the stronger “phenomenological” sense of that term.
Therefore interiority, transcendentally apprehended and revealed
in phenomenologically reduced consciousness, has (for Husserl) a
different mode of being than subjective and real mental processes.
In this way, a new understanding of transcendence (called
“transcendence in immanence”) is stressed by Husserl.
Transcendence in immanence can be distinguished from the
transcendence manifested by transcendent objects and ideal
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essences, even if both of the latter are now revealed only in the
former. So the focus on interiority comes to have a more central
and elaborate role in Husserl’s phenomenology even as he
radicalizes and expands the meaning of intentionality by applying
the reduction. For this reason, Husserl’s “ontologically motivated”
distinction of interiority from external being through use of the
reduction, once again, requires qualiﬁcation.
While true that, in the ﬁrst part of the Ideas I, Husserl introduces
his transcendental phenomenology by focusing on formal and
material ontologies (as “regions”, cf. Husserl, 1980,
§§ 9–17, 18–32), this focus on existence now becomes a
transcendental exercise. Husserl’s “regions of being” are not meant
to designate transcendent being (the natural world-horizon).
Making
use
of
the
phenomenological
reduction,
Husserl is concerned with how objectivity is “constituted” (made
sense of) by examining purely immanent possibility conditions. In
the Ideas I, for example, consciousness is ultimately conceived of as
a region unto itself.15 Here, and elsewhere, consciousness is
equated to a primal region (Urregion) grounding all others
(Husserl, 1980, § 33, 65–66). This is not because, as immanent
being, consciousness is opposed to or metaphysically removed
from worldly existence by Husserl; rather he came to believe
that consciousness is what establishes access to the world for us in
its “factical” (faktisch) sense. In the Ideas I, Husserl both introduces
a preliminary version of the paradox of subjectivity (it would more
prominently resurface and also be ofﬁcially named in the Crisis
manuscript) and gives unquestionable support to an internalist
account of justifying beliefs. In Ideas I paragraph 53, he writes:
…on the one hand consciousness is said to be the absolute
in which everything transcendent and, therefore, ultimately
the whole psychophysical world, becomes constituted; and,
on the other hand, consciousness is said to be a subordinate
real event within that world. How can these statements be
reconciled? (Husserl, 1980: 124)
And in paragraph 54 we ﬁnd the following:
All empirical unities, and, therefore, also psychological mental
processes, are indices pointing to concatenations of absolute
mental processes having a distinctive essential formation,
along with which other formations are imaginable; all are, in
the same sense, transcendent, merely relative, accidental. One
must convince oneself that the obviousness with which every
mental process in one’s own life or in another’s is accepted,
and quite legitimately, as a psychological and psychophysical
sequence of states of an animate subject, has its limit in the
aforementioned consideration: that in contrast to the
empirical mental process there stands, as a presupposition
for the sense of that process, the absolute mental process; that
the latter is not a metaphysical construction but rather
something which, in its absoluteness, can become indubitably
demonstrated, given in direct intuition by a corresponding
change in one’s attitude. One must convince oneself that
anything psychical, in the sense relevant to psychology,
psychical personality, psychical properties, mental processes
or states, are empirical unities and are, therefore, like other
realities of every kind and level, merely unities of intentional
“constitution” in its sense, truly existing: intuitable, experienceable, scientiﬁcally determinable on the basis of experience, but still “merely intentional” and hence merely
“relative.” To take them as existing in the absolute sense is
consequently a countersense (Husserl, 1980: 128).
Husserl is, therefore, obviously interested in interiority as a
possibility condition of “sense-making” activities for all living

rational beings. He is also now quite adamant that no logicalabstract or empirical (including psychological) approach to
conceptualizing interiority is sufﬁcient for fully grasping its
depths. This means that the immanent actuality of transcendentally apprehended consciousness, in its full signiﬁcance, cannot be
captured in any “eidetic” reduction and instead requires the more
radical transcendental phenomenological reduction.16 It does not
mean that the space of interiority is understood negatively or
viewed as what constitutes a hidden realm derived from external
transcendent structures or spatio-temporal and causally
conditioned external events and relations. Husserl’s position,
however, is problematic due to its failure to fully engage with, and
outline a metaphysical account of, what can be called the
“noematic correlates” of noetic activity. Here, some comments on
how Husserl’s static-phenomenological understanding of
interiority connects to the immanence of the phenomenological
ground uncovered in the reduction will prove useful.
In moving from bracketing the world (through the epoché), and
after actualizing the transcendental phenomenological reduction
to capture the true sense of the immediate internal acts of
perception in reﬂection, nothing less than the neutralization of
the “doxic-positing” (Setzen) of being is said to be achieved.
Therefore, from an initial suspension of what Husserl calls “the
natural attitude”, all connection to the worldly “being-sense” of
objects can be said to be analogously suspended (Husserl, 1980,
§§ 31–32, 57–62). The suspension of the “being sense” of natural
worldly life is not, however, an abstract transformation of the data
of empirical consciousness, or a reﬂection of the external world
inside our minds. This turn inwards is instead viewed by Husserl
as a deepening of the full sense of normal, worldly, object-taking
conscious acts. Instead of taking consciousness for granted,
however, we now grasp how positing acts work to give rise
to the natural supposition (Vermutung) of an external world.
Examining the implications of these experiential accomplishments reﬂectively is what allows the intentionality of consciousness to be viewed as a theme for exploration. Husserl then
introduces new terminology (the noesis-noema correlation)
for thematizing the fact that doxic acts are always object-taking
(cf. Husserl, 2001b: 17–22; 267).17 However, as mentioned,
this initial static account of the transcendental reduction remains
unsatisfactory since no ontological analysis accompanies
Husserl’s descriptive phenomenological accounts of the
structures of experience.18
After expanding his studies to include further analyses of
temporality (mostly excluded from the Ideas I), and after stressing
the intersubjective nature of transcendental experience, Husserl
came to hold that an even deeper (but passive) level of
constitution exists.19 In his later writings, he attempts to more
clearly formulate this distinction between a deeper sphere of
interiority and related levels of immanence contributing to the
constitution of meaning. The internal horizon (complementing
the external horizon of the world) is thus equated to the realm of
transcendental subjectivity. For the mature Husserl, furthermore,
all doxic-positing in the transcendental attitude comes to be
viewed as a modal modiﬁcation of intentional horizontal
consciousness (Längsintentionalität). As a consequence of
transcendental intentional analysis what is “interior” now gains
yet another perspective from which to be apprehended in relation
to objective structures. The phenomenological reduction (later
undergoing yet another critical modiﬁcation into what can be
called an “apodictic” reduction, cf. Husserl, 2002: 178) is now
articulated by Husserl as incrementally allowing further and more
radically dynamic perspectives on interiority.20 The later Husserl
introduces the term “transcendental experience” in order to study
what he calls these “essential structures” revealed by deeper
insights into passive aspects of consciousness. In his exploration
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of internal time consciousness, for example, Husserl came to
believe that the ﬂow of time opens a new dimension of
transcendence for the ego. Since time is the essential condition
against which all conscious acts unfold, a pre-temporal vertical
intentionality (Querintentionalität) must complement horizontal
intentional acts with the two working in tandem to constitute the
deepest level of experience: absolute consciousness (Husserl,
1990: 80–81).21
In later studies, Husserl also describes both pure and empirical
acts of consciousness as revealing essential data. Regarding the
sense of internal factors relating to experience, Husserl gives
detailed accounts of how consciousness manifest its very own
“felt necessities” that are not to be confused with “causal” factors
inﬂuencing knowledge and, therefore, should not be confused
with objective forces outside of experience. “Motivations”,
instead, are said to be expressions of internally formed habits,
instinctually connecting together subjective life (cf. Husserl,
1989b, §§ 56, 63). However, no causal or genetic laws can be
turned to for determining the unfolding of these intentional acts
and, in the same way, no externalist account of knowledge
attainment can fully explain how knowing subjects can grasp
objective facts about the world that can be both intuitively and
inter-subjectively conﬁrmed.
By the early 1920’s, therefore, Husserl had come to maintain
that no form of neutralization could characterize the absence of
doxic positing in an act of pure free fantasy (freie Phantasie)
(Husserl, 2001b, § 20). Fantasy or imagination, as internal
thought, is, in this way, clearly separated from both acts of
memory and other merely subjective forms of image consciousness. These later formulations have consequences for how the
mature Husserl comes to clarify his method of eidetic variation
which, in turn, inﬂuences his understanding of both adequate
knowledge and apodictic or essential insights.22 Husserl’s studies
of inter-subjectivity and the essentially embodied status of
cognition also led him to eventually understand truth as fully
and actually grasped by an embodied living ego-subject in the Lifeworld.
Transcendental Phenomenology as a response to the
“paradox of subjectivity”
Transcendental philosophy in general has been called a
“philosophy of the subject” (cf. Henrich, 2003). Husserl would
have agreed with this characterization and his explorations of the
foundation of experience led him (although anticipated here by
Kant) to locate access to an “a priority” within the knowing
subject. The turn inward, as Husserl was also aware, marked his
project as broadly Cartesian (and, therefore, modern) in essence.
Husserl’s project has been described as a “(truer) synthesis of
rationalism and empiricism than what Kant was able to offer”.23
Here, it can be noted that interesting consequences for
understanding interiority and internalist factors in justifying
knowledge result from Husserl’s transcendental methods. The
method of eidetic variation, for example, can be distinguished
from any straightforward psychological act of apprehending
contents. When we reﬂect without performing the reduction, we
focus on interior data given in imagination or internal images in
consciousness that are indirectly dependent on real but subjective
conditions. Through the reduction, Husserl thinks, we can purify
all empirical factors leading to a subjective focus but one that
helps us to grasp essential structures. This new assessment of
access to necessary structures vitiates against viewing Husserl’s
transcendental concept of the interior as a closed off container or
Cartesian theater. In effect, it can be said, in deconstructing the
“natural attitude”, Husserl’s thought became even more radically
opposed to the reiﬁed “container” models of consciousness.
6

In his transcendental phenomenology, therefore, Husserl is
interested in interiority as opening up a radical form of
immanence different in kind from any psychological or worldly
sense of interior private space. Husserl’s accomplishment here
cannot be underestimated. If the reduction is workable, then
transcendence in immanence can be viewed as both internal and
external with consequences for any exploration of epistemological
questions. Although some of the essentialist aspects of the
transcendental strategy used to justify the full reduction will be
criticized below–vitiating against Husserl’s claims that he can
adequately secure the transcendence of essences from an analyses
of consciousness — rather than reject Husserl’s mature
methodology and assumptions outright, we can instead take a
different approach. For example, one thing that seems certain is
that Husserl’s transcendental methods address matters that are
relevant to epistemology. In distinguishing the properly “phenomenological” realm (transcendental subjectivity) from both
transcendent ‘worldly’ and transcendent ‘eidetic’ spheres, for
example, the reduction offers a more radical exploration of
interiority than can be found in alternative approaches. Moreover, in highlighting how interior conditions act as essential to
the attainment of knowledge, Husserl’s phenomenology highlights how the “paradox of subjectivity” should be of central
concern to any fully philosophical account of belief formation
and the attainment of knowledge.
Thus, while at no point in his career did Husserl subordinate
the clariﬁcation of essences to real or psychologically internal
conscious states, he was later puzzled about how natural
consciousness (as descriptively apprehended) provides proper
motivation for engaging in the transcendental reduction permitting access to transcendental subjectivity. If, as his genetic studies
led him to believe, passive affection is the primordial foundation
of perception and knowledge, and if passive genetic constitution
(and temporality) are beyond the grasp of apodictic descriptive
insights, this leads to an immediate tension regarding the
determination of the essential differences between the subjective
structures in concrete versus their transcendental forms (that is,
as apprehended from within the transcendental perspective). This
complex problem ﬁnds expression in Husserl’s mature thought by
a new focus being placed on the “paradox of subjectivity”.
According to the mature Husserl the paradox of subjectivity can
be said to arise when we attempt to theoretically account for
essential and objective structures, the facts grasped by thought, by
relegating them the unavoidable epistemic status of conditions
somehow connected to subjectivity.24 An obvious candidate for
theoretically classifying subjective states, and thereby classifying
different experiences, is the science of psychology. However, as
was noted, the later Husserl held psychology to be incapable
(in any of its existing forms) of addressing the paradox of
subjectivity. For this reason, and since it is not a properly
transcendental approach to investigating experience, Husserl held
that psychology shared the failure of all previous scientiﬁc
attempts to distinguish between worldly and transcendental
contents in consciousness.
The paradox of subjectivity, therefore, cannot be addressed by
objective science, since natural scientiﬁc knowledge is bound to
the “natural attitude” and, as such, does not attempt to answer
ultimate questions about, for example, the justiﬁcation of
principles of logic and knowledge claims. Objective science,
therefore, ignores the essential being-status of the phenomena it
explores. In a similar vein, the positive sciences are said to take
the natural world for granted. Phenomenology, by contrast,
accepts the paradox of subjectivity by tracing its origin to the
hidden—constituting—acts of consciousness making up the
ultimate horizon of knowledge: the life-world. As a result,
Husserl came to accept that subjectivity is essentially correlated to
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every objective content or transcendent entity precisely as the
pre-condition for appearances. The paradox is resolved, Husserl
thinks, once the basic tenets of transcendental idealism are
accepted as central to phenomenology. We can then accept that
we are both natural beings in the world, but also necessarily
dependent, in order to actualize the full dimensions of our
cognitive lives, on the inter-subjectively constituted structures of
transcendental consciousness.
Internalism and Externalism redux or what Husserlian
phenomenology can contribute to epistemological
internalism
In contemporary epistemology the focus on how interior sources
are relevant for justifying belief claims has led to a debate
surrounding the distinction between “internalist” versus “externalist” explanations of the justiﬁcation of knowledge. While many
philosophers have noted that the concepts “internal” and
“external” are, in effect, ambivalent blanket terms, very few have
offered sustained phenomenological assessments to help clarify
the sense these concepts have. Subsequently, few epistemologists connect the internalism-externalism debate to the paradox
of subjectivity. The above examination of Husserlian phenomenology, however, has provided important clues for how an
internalist might further address the philosophical question of
what role thought and consciousness have in grasping truth. Since
his writings carefully explored the subjective elements necessary
for allowing us to grasp truth in the ﬁrst place, Husserl’s
phenomenology may also be able to shed light on the internalism/
externalism debate.
The main virtue of applying Husserlian tools to existing
internalist frameworks is the help they might provide in more
carefully examining what is called “the basing problem”, that is,
the relation between beliefs and our reasons for holding them, by
highlighting how the examination of the role of “truth-making”
conditions in relation to properly internal factors in the
formation and justiﬁcation of belief is important. Subsequently,
the essence of truth—if we adopt a Husserlian strategy—cannot
be grounded on interiority understood in any empirical or real
(spatio-temporal) sense. Nonetheless, internal or immanent
conditions must be present to both establish reference and do
work as necessary conditions for securing belief and evidence.
Truth, for Husserl, is manifested in a mediated way through
experience but cannot be established on contingent “causal”
grounds or in any solely subjective way.
Nonetheless, Husserl’s approach can still be viewed critically
insofar as, on his account, interiority (understood phenomenologically) can never give full access to the absolute transcendence of
phenomena.25 This last fact points to a challenge facing orthodox
Husserlians who must address the prominent role played by the
method of the transcendental reduction as a strategy for clarifying
truth claims by suspending all external relations. In this respect it is
interesting to note that, to date, Husserl’s name has been invoked
by proponents of both internalism and externalism, as well as
critics of both approaches, in support of their positions.26 In what
follows I will argue, building on the above outline of Husserl’s
thought, that transcendental phenomenology can be viewed as a
sui generis form of internalism. This renders Husserlian
phenomenology relevant for addressing questions central to
epistemological internalism, nonetheless its methods run into
limits that will require supplementation if any ontological or
deeper analysis of the internal and external as philosophical
categories are to be arrived at.
David Woodruff Smith summed up the ongoing problem of
characterizing the metaphysical status of Husserl’s thought in one
brief sentence: “The question “Realism or Idealism or What?” is

perhaps the thorniest branch of interpretation in Husserl
scholarship” (Smith, 2007: 169).27 In his later writings, Husserl
claimed that his mature transcendental idealism should not be
understood as metaphysical in any traditional sense of that term.
Although Husserl’s position has been read as amounting to a
fundamental break with all traditional philosophy and
metaphysics (in fact all earlier modes of thought), there exist
many references in his writings that indicate how phenomenology
aimed at being more than merely methodological in scope. In his
later years, for example, Husserl often viewed his project as a
radical and pure science but also as manifesting an explicitly
philosophical dimension.28 These references, to be sure, can be
confusing. For Husserl’s phenomenology to be philosophical in
the deepest sense implies a metaphysical understanding of his
project.
While most commentators seem to agree that Husserl’s mature
or transcendental phenomenology has (or implies) some kind of
idealist metaphysical doctrine at its core (usually also characterized as compatible with a Cartesian sense of metaphysical
“internalism” in epistemology), Smith is correct that there is no
universal agreement on how to interpret Husserl’s phenomenology as metaphysics. We are, however, in many ways, in a better
position today to answer the above question of how to understand
the relation between Husserlian phenomenology and ontology or
theory of external and mind-independent being than many of
Husserl’s contemporaries were.29 Perhaps because of the often
voiced assessment that Husserl was a Cartesian, his thought is still
frequently taken to advocate a strongly immanentest form of
internalism. This assessment can be challenged on several fronts.
As was shown above, the details of Husserl’s “Cartesian” strategy
for establishing truth conditions for knowledge is, ﬁrst, hardly
analogous to what some contemporary philosophers call
internalism—either traditional (representationalist) or modern
(mentalist) accounts, and especially not if we mean the term in a
stronger ontologically committed sense. Husserl’s focus on
interiority, as was claimed above, cannot be taken as equivalent
to any simple advocacy of subjective reﬂection or empirical
introspection as leading to anything like a reliable justiﬁcation of
knowledge claims.30
What Husserl can contribute to the position of internalism is
the following. To begin, his writings can help articulate how the
focus on ultimate justiﬁcation must be explored with some
reference to the phenomenology of knowing. As was outlined
above, Husserl’s strategy goes hand in hand with attempts to gain
insight into both the essence of scientiﬁc knowledge and the
possibility conditions for any knowledge whatsoever. After the
transcendental-phenomenological reduction is undertaken, Husserl maintains, pre-delineated and intuitively apprehended
“apodictic” insights can be obtained. These justiﬁed insights are
the only possible way to establish the most fundamental
conditions for making truth-claims. Truth for Husserl, as for
many philosophers, has a central role in the study of knowledge
but whereas earlier thinkers (such as Descartes and his empiricist
successors) took either “clarity” and “distinctness” or the vivacity
of subjective ideas and impressions to be the conditions for
discerning truth, Husserl focuses on evidence as given either in a
mediated or immediate manner and with or without adequacy
and apodicticity.
Ignoring (for various reasons) the naive or popular distinction
between the “inner” and the “outer” (as understood for example
by so-called “folk psychology”), whether we take the philosophical category of “internalism” to signify what can be called
epistemological (semantic) levels of establishing truth-making
conditions or an ontological and metaphysical category representing a concrete aspect of mind-independent reality, it can be
seen that Husserl has something to contribute to improving our
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understanding of the internal. Epistemological internalism, for
example, is a necessary condition for understanding truth
according to Husserl.31 On this view, in order for someone to
grasp the truth of a proposition “that p” (that is, p’s being the
case) a necessarily internal set of events is required. The above
mentioned theory of “epistemological internalism” is sometimes
formulated with an attendant stronger claim that the mental (or
“mind dependent” aspects of the grounding of our knowledge
claims) is in some signiﬁcant sense also sufﬁcient for grasping
truth; independent of external factors in establishing what a
proposition is about. Husserl’s work is also relevant here. The
above stronger formulation of the “access problem” promoting
knowledge internalism can be described as presenting
individuation conditions for thoughts and thought contents as
established inter alia without any direct reference to wider “nonmental” (read: physical or objective) contexts, or objects, or states
of affairs.32 Here, Husserl would disagree.
According to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, the
reﬂective insights into both adequate and apodictic sources of
knowledge are neither strongly internalist nor statically formal or
externalist. Whereas, it might be believed that phenomenology
makes internal reﬂection on concepts an always adequately given
and secure source for grasping truth (as was the case for
Descartes), Husserl came to view the internal horizon of
experience as inadequate since conditioned by temporal aspects.
Moreover, precisely as temporally conditioned, Husserl’s phenomenological insights cannot be tied into any deductive or
strictly formal sources to begin with, as they are simply not given
in anything like an enclosed delimited “interior space”. Through
his genetic studies of the temporal nature of pre-predicative
experience, for example, Husserl tried to show how the ultimate
normative basis for all knowledge (whether formal-scientiﬁc or
non-formal) was the ecstatic self-constituting ground of the intersubjective ﬁeld of transcendental subjectivity. Viewed as a region
or space of meaning, this ground can effectively be described as a
sedimented series of accomplishments in the ultimate worldhorizon: the life-world. Finally, the life-world, while the true
source of all experience and knowledge, is also viewed by Husserl
as a ﬁeld of ego-monads.33
Taking all the above factors into consideration we can say that,
on the Husserlian framework, the process of afﬁrming truth can
be parsed as follows. First it requires a basis (something that can
be immediately grasped as true or false) and, subsequently, our
truth-claims must meet speciﬁc conditions (requirements of
fulﬁllment) that can establish what-is-the-case. The latter, truthmaking conditions, of course, are what internalists and
externalists largely disagree about. As we saw, Husserl, from
early on, made internal conditions essential for truth-making.
Furthermore, in his work we ﬁnd a theory of propositional
content (truth-bearing conditions) that can be distinguished from
cognitive judgments (as intentional acts constituting situations
and forming beliefs that can be true or false) with propositions
and judgment acts both distinguished from states-of-affairs which
(if veriﬁed in experience) become the truth-makers. How is the
claim that my computer is on my desk corroborated? On
Husserl’s account by looking at my desk and seeing that my
computer is there before me. The same sensual immediate access
to evidence conﬁrming a veridical perception, moreover, is also at
work serving as a founding act which forms the basis that permits
the achievement of higher order truths.
Nonetheless, in outlining Husserl’s thought in the above way
and imposing it onto the internalism-externalism debate, we
quickly run up against Smith’s problem of interpreting the
accompanying “transcendental idealism” that Husserl himself
stressed was essential to his mature project (cf. Husserl, 1950:
119). After all, according to Husserl, the computer is given to me
8

in a series of necessarily subjective acts that reveal its presence
through a connection of “adumbrations” or aspects that unfold in
a law-like way. In adopting a postulate of epistemic primacy and
branding the computer a transcendent and not imagined or
hallucinated object, this still leaves open the question of what the
real existential status of the computer might be. In this respect,
maintaining that Husserl is an externalist, because a mindtranscendent object “causes” our beliefs about existence to form,
is untenable. This reading seems to presuppose that some kind of
systematic ontological position can be attributed to Husserl’s
later phenomenological thought (and this does not seem to
be the case). In fact, Husserl was apparently unable to complete
the ultimate synthesis that his phenomenological studies
required to establish a fully philosophical account of his research.
Finally, it can be said that Husserl’s essentialism, especially
as it relates to his generative phenomenological method (in
linking passive forms of motivation to external and causal
categories conditioning static forms of constitution) also remains
problematic precisely as a philosophical account of essentialism in
relation to a descriptive ground for establishing ultimate existence
claims.34
Given the central role of intuiting essences and bracketing
existence claims in Husserl’s overall strategy, the above shortcomings render any metaphysical interpretation of his system
problematic at best. Therefore, and since the ultimate transcendence of objects and essential structures are given in phenomenological immanence, Husserl cannot be called an
epistemological externalist. Husserl’s phenomenology, therefore,
should be regarded as a sui generis form of internalism.
Conclusion
It was shown how Husserl’s thought, from early on, focused on
understanding interiority and immanence as essential aspects of
experience. Through his transcendental approach to phenomenology Husserl attempted to categorize different forms of
immanence and analyse the role of various reﬂective acts in
establishing truth claims. In conclusion, Husserlian phenomenology can be viewed as a sui generis kind of internalism with, as
was pointed out, tensions resulting from his position (especially
regarding the incorporation of his essentialist framework
premised on the transcendental method of reduction, to nontranscendentally conceived ontological categories). These tensions work to mitigate against afﬁrmations of Husserlian
phenomenology as epistemologically externalist. Criticisms of
its brand of essentialism, however, do not diminish the usefulness
of the role that Husserlian phenomenology can have in better
understanding internalism and externalism. For example, externalist positions, in positing a standard for knowledge lying beyond
experience (premising, in effect, “a view from nowhere”) and
holding beliefs to be ultimately justiﬁed independent of any
essentially subjective factors, render themselves incoherent from
the Husserlian perspective, since they ignore and bypass, rather
than engage with, the “paradox of subjectivity”. By contrast, taken
seriously, Husserl’s paradox of subjectivity provides an important
clue in exploring the nature of knowledge and the connection
between experience and science. The above study has shown how
a fuller understanding of Husserl’s writings is important to these
contemporary concerns.
Nonetheless, any application of transcendental phenomenology
to these problems must ultimately move beyond a strictly
phenomenological account of the ultimate categories of transcendence or immanence. Insofar as we are interested in understanding interiority philosophically, however, few thinkers
provide more resources for exploring this theme in greater detail
than Husserl.
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Notes
11
1 A large part of the problem in resolving the internalism/externalism question is
certainly due to the ambiguity of those terms. Internalism, for example, can be
regarded either as a category in meta-epistemology or as an idealist position making a
stronger, ontological, case about the grounds for the justiﬁcation of beliefs. In what
follows I defend an epistemological reading of internalism that borrows resources
developed by Husserl for exploring the justiﬁcation of knowledge. Epistemologically,
the strength of maintaining an internalist versus externalist view of the justiﬁcation of
belief states can be connected to the more coherent resolution offered by the former
to what contemporary epistemologists call the “access problem” and the “basing
requirements” necessary for explaining the content of a belief state. For some historical background on the categories “externalist” and “internalist” as well as a critical
assessment of the accompanying vagueness of these terms in contemporary philosophy of mind, cf. (Feldman and Conee, 2004). For more details on how internalist
factors are related to epistemic justiﬁcation as responses to Gettier cases (cf. Feldman
and Conee, 2004, esp. pp. 144–146 and Poston, 2017). Further accounts of internalist
versus externalist arguments for justifying belief can be found in (Pappas, 2017). For
an inﬂuential advocate of the “externalist” strategy see (Armstrong, 1973) (which
may be the earliest known use of the term “externalism”). For modern applications of
internalist accounts of knowledge attainment used in a contemporary sense outside of
the phenomenological tradition, and stemming from a broadly conceived “Cartesian”
premises, cf. (Goldman, 1980: 27–52) and (Bonjour, 1980: 53–74).
2 Husserl’s original phenomenological method began to take shape at the turn of the
twentieth century and grew out of earlier sustained analyses of the theoretical
foundations of logic and mathematics. For examples of Husserl’s earlier writings on
mathematics, logic and descriptive psychology see: (Husserl, 1970), (Husserl, 1983),
and (Husserl, 1979).
3 Intentionality in contemporary philosophy is a technical term for describing the
character of “aboutness” or directedness that thought has. Understood in this way, it
is not concerned with practical intentions or pragmatic aspects of behavior and
thought. Terminologically, the concept of mental intentionality is a development of
the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of the “intention” signifying object-directed
thinking. Husserl, however, uses the term as it was used by his teacher Franz
Brentano who introduced the concept of “intentional inexistence” in his writings.
Brentano not only re-introduces the Scholastic terminology but interprets it in the
context of a modern psychological framework by making intentionality the empirically relevant “mark of the mental”. Brentano also characterized intentional quality of
psychic object-taking acts as their “aboutness” and manifesting a “relation-like”
quality that pertains to all mental life and helps distinguish it from what he called
“physical phenomena”. cf. (Brentano, 1874: 124–126).
4 The full texts of the Investigations can be found in: (Husserl, 1975), (Husserl, 1984),
(Husserl, 2001) and (Husserl, 2002b).
5 For an account of Husserl’s own purpose for writing the Investigations see (Husserl,
1975b).
6 cf. (Husserl, 2001, vol. 2, p. 166). As Robert Sokolowski points out, Husserl’s studies
begin “not by looking inward at consciousness…[or making use of]…introspection”
but: “through the public, palpable and worldly phenomena of signs, both indicative
and expressive”, (cf. Sokolowski, 2002: 171).
7 The work of developing transcendental phenomenology, subsequently, would occupy
Husserl for the rest of his life. His ambitions for moving phenomenology into a
transcendental framework also led Husserl to publish introduction after introduction
to the phenomenological method. These programmatic introductions make up most
of his mature published work. They span from Ideen I (1913) (cf. Husserl, 1980) to
Cartesianische Meditationen (1929) (cf. Husserl, 1950) and the late work: Die Krisis
der europäischen Wissenschaften (1936) (cf. Husserl, 1954). As is also well known,
Husserl’s published works were only the tip of an iceberg of thousands of pages of
important research manuscripts (Forschungsmanukripte). Husserl’s manuscripts bear
witness to the depth of his project as he undertakes therein concrete phenomenological studies often expanding on, but sometimes questioning, earlier results.
8 The shared features and differences of Husserl approach with the methods of the
earlier British empiricists have been remarked upon. For example, see Richard T.
Murphy who notes: “[t]hroughout his works…Husserl…often praised [the British
empiricists] and, in particular, saw in Hume's philosophy the culmination of a
worthwhile tradition, which constitutes the authentic forerunner of strict phenomenology” (Murphy, 1980: 90).
9 This assessment is maintained into his mature writings cf., Husserl’s critique of
Locke’s “physicalized soul” in the Crisis manuscript (Husserl, 1954: 85/Husserl,
1970b: 63). By 1911 Husserl attributes the appeal of empiricism to uncritical
acceptance of a naturalist framework as ontologically valid for explaining consciousness. In what follows our interest is in Husserl’s understanding of these earlier
movements and thinkers in his writings, any detailed consideration of how accurately
or faithfully he interprets earlier systems is beyond the scope of this paper.
10 Although the original aim of Husserl’s project was to provide a coherent theory of
science, in exploring questions about the origins of experience and knowledge his
work provides many philosophical insights. For example, Husserl’s critical assessment of empiricism as a ﬂawed epistemology leads him to maintain an alternative,
phenomenologically informed, account of how general ideas and concepts originate.
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On this point, see the Second Logical Investigation (Husserl, 2001, vol. 1, Inv. II, § 21)
and (Husserl, 1969: 14/ Husserl, 1974: 13).
For the early Husserl, interior aspects of mental acts serves as a foundation for
contributing to meaning. Founded and experienced contents participate in the
signitive role of intending meaning and also contribute to the expression of actual
meaning by constituting “intentional” objectivating acts possessing both a “material”
and “qualitative” aspect, cf. (Husserl, 1984/2 96–7/Husserl, 2001: 244–246). Intentional acts also present objects and contents and in this way can fulﬁll (or fail to
fulﬁll) meaning intentions. Objectifying acts as treated in the Sixth Logical Investigation and held there to be the interior conditions for making possible both signiﬁcative (meaning-bestowing) and intuitive (meaning-fulﬁlling) conditions in both
sensuous and categorial intuition cf. (Husserl, 1984/2, p. 748; 749–750). The focus on
perception and its role in linking meaning to reference, however, is also richly
exploited by Husserl in the sections of the Investigations treating of “indexical”
expressions cf., (Husserl, 2001/1, §§ 13ff, p. 26; vol. 2/Inv. VI, §§ 4, 25, 44, and so on.).
cf. (Husserl, 1965: 71–147). The allusions above to the “validity” of statements
(Geltung) and things valid “in” and “for” themselves, are a testament, even at this late
date, to the strong inﬂuence on Husserl’s thought of the earlier German thinkers
Bernard Bolzano and R. Hermann Lotze.
The transcendental reduction in Husserl, therefore, is meant to serve a dual role.
First, it allows insight into the fundamental grounds of knowledge and being, that is,
eliminating skeptical threats to objective knowledge by showing the grounds of that
knowledge. This point should be stressed since many read Husserl’s epoché and
methods of bracketing as themselves skeptical moves and related to the “removal the
world of things”. As will be shown, the reduction is better viewed as a radical
modiﬁcation of reﬂection allowing for concrete insights and Husserl was convinced
anyone could learn and practice it. The reduction, therefore, combines practical or
regulative with theoretical concerns and insights about epistemology. Through the
reduction Husserl wants to elucidate how beliefs can be justiﬁed and evidence that
can lead us to truth and authentic knowledge obtained.
Husserl thinks that it is within an immanent sphere of immediate accessibility that we
are given both “absolute phenomena in their singularity” and phenomena as the
objects of “ideating abstraction” cf. (Husserl, 1950: 7, 35–8).
For an account of regional ontology in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cf.
(Landgrebe, 1963: 145ff).
Nonetheless, many critics of the Ideas I understood Husserl’s theory of “eidetic
variation” as the giving of a key role to subjective exercises of imagination as constituting the phenomenological method. This reading, of course, distorts the actual
meaning of the reduction by binding phenomenology to a quasi-aesthetic mode of
reﬂection. This mistaken reading also confuses the different kinds of reﬂection elucidated by Husserl in the Ideas I and elsewhere. In effect, the above interpretation
takes transcendental phenomenology to be a kind of eidetic psychology, that is, a
science of essences obtained in a psychologically immanent–internal-sphere. However, Husserl was very clear that this was not the case: “[C]onsciousness, as a datum
of psychological experience…is an object of psychology, in experiential scientiﬁc
research, an object of empirical psychology; in essential scientiﬁc research, an object
of eidetic psychology. On the other hand, as having the modiﬁcation effected by
parenthesizing, the whole world with all its psychical individuals and their psychical
processes [Erlebnisse], belongs within phenomenology: all of it as a correlate of
absolute consciousness” (Husserl, 1980: 172 translation slightly modiﬁed/ Husserl,
1976: 143). Obviously this “within” should not be understood in an objectivist, that is,
externalist, sense.
cf. (Husserl, 2001b).
The entire account of the noema in the Ideas I is fraught with problems. To take only
one example, Husserl claims that the “iterability” of imaginative presentations allows
for the fact that one can imagine imagining an object [cf. Husserl, 1976: 251–253].
Here, one is genuinely forced to wonder how the above representation can be in any
way “eidetically manifested”? What is missing from the account of the reduction in
Ideas I are Husserl’s genetic methods and involvement of constitution at the deeper
level of internal time-consciousness.
The study of time consciousness will open up, for Husserl, genetic phenomenological
studies of constitution. In Ideas I §81, Husserl writes: “time is a name for a completely
delimited sphere of problems and one of exceptional difﬁculty” (Husserl, 1980: 193).
cf. (Husserl, 2002).
What this implies, according to Husserl, is both that consciousness is internally
related only to itself and that the absolute ﬂow of consciousness is, properly speaking,
“supra-“ or trans-temporal: “The ﬂow is something we speak of in conformity with
what is constituted…[it is] …absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of
something to be designated metaphorically as a “ﬂow”: the absolute properties of a
point of actuality, of the primal source-point “now”, and so on. In the actualityexperience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of reverberation. For all
this, we have no names.” (Husserl, 1990: 370).
cf. for example, see (Husserl, 1939b), the posthumously published Erfahrung und
Urteil, §§ 87a–d for an account essential seeing as grounded on pre-predicative
experience.
See (Banham, 2005: 2–3). On transcendental philosophy see (Heinrich, 2003). On
Husserl’s characterization of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy of
experience, see Part II of Ideas I § 62 where he claims: “[i]t is understandable that
phenomenology is, so to speak, the secret nostalgia of all modern philosophy.”
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(Husserl, 1980: 142). Husserl adds that the ﬁrst thinker to truly perceive the profundity of Descartes’ fundamental thought, (that is, the turn to the subject) was Kant,
albeit with the disclaimer that Kant misinterprets phenomenology as a form of
transcendental psychology. Elsewhere Husserl writes of how transcendental phenomenology is the only single philosophy among all modern thought: “…in which
modernity’s striving for the transcendental [has achieved] complete clarity and
provided a solidly formed, apodictically necessary idea of transcendental philosophy”
(Husserl, 1989: 168).
In the Crisis text § 53 Husserl writes: “…[T]he juxtaposition subjectivity in the world
as “object” and at the same time “conscious subject for the world,” contain a
necessary theoretical question, that of understanding how this is possible” (Husserl,
1970b: 180–181). The paradox of subjectivity seems to be the mature correlate of
what Don Welton refers to as “the paradox of objectivity” in Husserl’s earlier pretranscendental writings. According to Welton, the possibility of the condition for an
object realm cannot itself be objective (that is, another object realm). Instead, in the
Logical Investigations, consciousness [the condition for the presentation of “real”
objects] is at times described by Husserl precisely as just such an ideal object realm.
cf. (Welton, 2000: 73–74). Thus, on this reading Husserl moves his thought into a
consistently transcendental position after the Investigations precisely to avoid this
problem; yet the radical presupposition of pure subjective structures grounding all
possible experience now call for their own explanation that his transcendental phenomenology will seek, with varying degrees of success, to provide.
Intuitive or immediate givenness is at the heart of Husserl’s phenomenological
method, guided by what he called the principle of principles: “every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition…” (Husserl, 1980: 44). Nonetheless Husserl acknowledged that different types of intuition give evidence according
to varying degrees of objectivity. Regarding external transcendence towards phenomena, there can be no immediate insight into the true nature or aspects of reality,
which transcend intuitive presentation. To better understand these dimensions,
Husserl says, the symbolic knowledge of the positive sciences is required. Unfortunately, Husserl also thinks that phenomenology is supposed to clarify the nature and
role of these same objective sciences and be a “science of science”. These claims lead
to tensions in his work regarding the proper role of phenomenology as metaphysicselucidating what is beyond the grasp of empirical science, and as an eidetic science in
its own right clarifying the basis and foundations of all knowledge claims.
A. D. Smith, for example, has described Husserl’s phenomenological approach as
providing potential insights into, and a more sophisticated understanding of,
externalism and mental reference. Smith argues that Husserl’s phenomenology
provides both a “disjunctivist” understanding of the mind-world relationship as well
as articulating a realist account of intentional acts related to the “world horizon” (cf.
Smith, 2008: 313–33). Dan Zahavi, on the other hand, has claimed that Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology explodes the purported internalist/externalist distinctions altogether (cf. Zahavi, 2004: 42–66). More precisely Zahavi thinks that, in
important ways, Husserl’s thought transcends or corrects the Cartesian tradition of
the “philosophy of the subject” (the latter, of course, being the internalist tradition
that Husserl’s thought is frequently seen as exemplifying). Zahavi also maintains that
Husserlian phenomenology is a viable alternative to what he describes as “analytical”
approaches in philosophy of mind. Thus, according to Zahavi, if we take Husserl’s
transcendental idealism seriously it can potentially call into question “the very
division between inner and outer” (Zahavi, 2004: 52). Finally, Lilian Alweiss has
likewise defended the position that Husserl (at least in the Investigations) is not a
methodological solipsist as any strong “internalist” reading of his thought would
contend. Even so, she argues that there are deﬁnite internalist aspects present in his
epistemology (Alweiss, 2009: 53–78). There seems to be, therefore, no consensus on
the exact position Husserl’s own writings have in relation to contemporary
internalist-externalist strategies and no universal agreement about what his thought
can precisely contribute to the debate.
cf. (Smith, 2007).
For example see Husserl’s letter to Dlithey of July 5/6, 1911 (Husserl, 1994: 50) and
his correspondence with the German/Swiss philosopher Karl Joël, March 11, 1914
(Husserl, 1994: 206–207). Evidence can be found that Husserl’s phenomenology does
make use of concepts and theories that point precisely to the subject matter that is
normally the focus of traditional philosophy and metaphysics. These concepts
include: necessity, existence, the absolute, and so on. The relationship between
phenomenology and philosophy moreover, can be corroborated from notes present
in Husserl’s research manuscripts and private correspondence. Nonetheless, translation of Husserl’s categories into traditional philosophical ones is rendered difﬁcult
by his own insistence that doing this is a “mortal sin” (“Todessünde”) prohibited by
his phenomenology. cf. (Husserl, 2002: 73).
The reason for this is that the editing and publication of Husserl research manuscripts (many of them written in an outdated shorthand script called Gabelsberger)
has only recently released volumes dealing closely with philosophy and metaphysics,
cf. https://hiw.kuleuven.be/hua/editionspublications/husserliana-gesammeltewerke.
Much of the content of these volumes still needs to be interpreted and more material
is planned for publication. cf. (Bernet, 2004).
Of course few modern internalists, excepting perhaps radical coherentists and idealists would accept this characterization of epistemological internalism. Nonetheless it
has been said to characterize Husserl’s thought. However, this reading is easily dispelled. For example, reference to his writings shows how, as early as 1902, in lectures
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developing his theory of the reduction Husserl clariﬁes his position in relation
Descartes. Descartes, he writes, was interested in constructing an absolutely ﬁxed basis
for knowledge (absoluten sicheren Fundamenten) by turning inward. Husserl, by
contrast, argues that he is not interested in this goal and describes his own focus as
being placed on the clariﬁcation of epistemological questions (cf. Husserl, 2001c: 90).
Historically, this immanent data has been called alternatively “reﬂection on presentations” (Descartes), “ideas” (Locke), or “impressions” (Hume). More recently,
following the lead of Hilary Putnam, internal data has been conceptualized to signify
the semantic conditions we require to, at the very least, make sense of truth claims.
Putnam deems this position “semantic internalism” and it amounts to the hypothesis
that, on some fundamental level, subjective mental or psychological factors condition
thought and are a necessary component of understanding both truth and meaning
(Putnam, 1975: 131–133). The Husserlian notion of the noema seems to have a
similar role as the contents of semantic internalists, but without uncritically presupposing the same naive naturalistic ontology.
For more detailed descriptions of these concepts see (Voltolini, 2005).
As in the case of calling his transcendental project “Cartesian”, the use of the term
“monad” is not to be taken in the traditional sense as used by Leibniz (that is, a selfenclosed, metaphysically isolated windowless and pre-programmed spiritual substance). For one thing, although Husserl says that the ego as a “sphere of ownness” is
an “absolute…monadic and primordial sphere” (Husserl, 1950, CM, IV, § 34, p. 103;
V, § 47, pp. 134–5), he also stresses that this sphere of ownness intrinsically manifests
“transcendence towards the intersubjective world” as an essential aspect of its nature.
Other descriptions of the transcendental ego as a “monad” make clear that Husserl
views it as always in an individuated process of becoming (read: not temporally ﬁnite
or closed off). As Anthony Steinbock attempts to clarify: “Self-temporalizing consciousness constitutes itself primordially as a unity of becoming in and through its
experiences, that is, through its diverse living presents” (Steinbock, 1995: 33). Husserl’s frequently infelicitous choice of terms to characterize his ideas sometimes
makes one wonder if he did not harbour an almost neurotic urge to be
misunderstood.
In this respect see Xavier Zubiri’s brilliant (but unfair) critique of Husserl’s theory of
essences. In his assessment Zubiri claims, pace Husserl, that essences cannot be the
meanings of things, but must be viewed as intrinsic formal properties of reality.
Although I think this a successful critique of Husserl’s static phenomenology, Zubiri’s
assessment ignores Husserl’s genetic and generative approach, which is closer in spirit
to his own later conception of an “open-essence” in relation to human existence
(Zubiri, 1980: 57–65). See also (Zhok, 2012) where it is argued that Husserlian
essences emerge from temporal experience and should therefore be viewed as
“ontological thresholds” separating “what is individual and transient from what is
stable and, therefore, ‘truly existent’” (Zhok, 2012: 127).
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